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_________________ 
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(D.C. No. 1:13-cv-02833) 
District Judge:  Hon. Noel L. Hillman 
_________________ 
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November 18, 2016 
 
Before:  AMBRO, SHWARTZ, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
 
(Filed:  December 12, 2016) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
After the District Court denied Plaintiff Anthony J. 
Carroll’s motion for partial summary judgment and 
Defendant Delaware River Port Authority’s motion for 
summary judgment, it certified the following legal question 
for our review: in a failure-to-promote discrimination suit 
under the Uniformed Services Employment and 
Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA,” 38 U.S.C. § 4301, et 
seq.), must a plaintiff plead and prove that he or she was 
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objectively qualified for the position sought?  We now answer 
that question in the negative.  In our view, plaintiffs need not 
plead or prove that they are objectively qualified in order to 
meet their initial burden under USERRA; instead, employers 
may raise a plaintiff’s lack of qualifications as a non-
discriminatory justification for declining to promote the 
plaintiff, notwithstanding his or her military service.  
 
I. 
 
This case centers on Carroll’s employment at the 
Port Authority.  Carroll was first hired by the Port Authority 
in 1989 as a police officer.  Between 1989 and 2009, he was a 
member of the uniformed services in various capacities, 
including six years as a corpsman in the United States Navy 
and ten years as a member of the Pennsylvania National 
Guard.  When not on active duty in the military, Carroll 
maintained his employment with the Port Authority, 
ascending to the rank of corporal in the Port Authority Police 
in 2004.  
 
Carroll was again ordered to active duty in late 
2008 and deployed to Iraq in early 2009, where he sustained 
injuries leading to such conditions as cervical spondylosis, 
degenerative disk disease, bilateral torn rotator cuffs, brain 
injury, and high-frequency hearing loss.  Carroll returned to 
the United States in late 2009 and was in rehabilitation for his 
injuries until his honorable discharge in late 2013.  Carroll 
has not worked for the Port Authority since he was deployed 
to Iraq in early 2009. 
 
In October 2010 and October 2012, while on active 
duty but in rehabilitation, Carroll applied to the Port 
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Authority for a promotion to the rank of sergeant.  Although 
he was interviewed in both 2010 and 2012, he was not 
promoted on either occasion.   
 
Carroll then sued the Port Authority under 
USERRA, alleging that he was not promoted to sergeant in 
2010 or 2012 due to unlawful discrimination on the basis of 
his military service.  After motion practice and discovery in 
the District Court, Carroll filed a motion for partial summary 
judgment—related to the 2012 promotion—and the Port 
Authority filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims.  
In so moving, the Port Authority argued that, to survive 
summary judgment, Carroll must raise a triable issue of fact 
on the question of whether he was objectively qualified for a 
promotion to sergeant.  The District Court denied both 
motions for summary judgment and Carroll’s subsequent 
motion for reconsideration.  The Port Authority then moved 
the District Court for an interlocutory appeal on the question 
of whether Carroll must plead and prove that he was 
objectively qualified for a promotion to sergeant in order to 
sustain his discrimination suit under USERRA.  The Court 
granted the Port Authority’s motion and certified that 
question for appeal. 
 
II.1 
 
The question presented is straightforward: in a 
failure-to-promote discrimination suit under USERRA, must 
a plaintiff plead and prove that he or she was objectively 
                                                 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  
We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). 
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qualified for the position sought?  The answer, we find, is 
equally straightforward: no.   
Congress enacted USERRA in 1994 to, inter alia, 
“encourage noncareer service in the uniformed services by 
eliminating or minimizing the disadvantages to civilian 
careers and employment which can result from such 
service.”2  To this end, USERRA prohibits the “deni[al] [of] 
initial employment, reemployment, retention in employment, 
promotion, or any benefit of employment by an employer on 
the basis of [a person’s] membership, application for 
membership, performance of service, application for service, 
or obligation [in a uniformed service].” 3   When plaintiffs 
allege discrimination in violation of USERRA, courts apply a 
two-step burden shifting framework adapted from NLRB v. 
Transportation Management Corp.:4  
 
[A]n employee making a 
USERRA claim of 
discrimination [] bear[s] 
the initial burden of 
showing by a 
                                                 
2 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1). 
3 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). 
4 462 U.S. 393 (1983), abrogated by Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Programs, Dep’t of Labor v. Greenwich Collieries, 
512 U.S. 267 (1994).  In Transportation Management, the 
Supreme Court applied a two-step burden shifting framework 
in the context of the National Labor Relations Act, which 
prohibits the discharge of a worker based on his or her union 
activity.  Id. at 401. 
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preponderance of the 
evidence that the 
employee’s military 
service was “a substantial 
or motivating factor” in the 
adverse employment 
action.  If this requirement 
is met, the employer then 
has the opportunity to 
come forward with 
evidence to show, by a 
preponderance of the 
evidence, that the employer 
would have taken the 
adverse action anyway, for 
a valid reason.5  
The Port Authority seeks to alter this framework by 
importing an additional requirement from other anti-
discrimination statutes.  According to the Port Authority, 
USERRA plaintiffs must sustain their initial burden by 
demonstrating two facts by a preponderance of the evidence: 
(1) that they were objectively qualified for the position 
sought, and (2) that their military service was “a substantial or 
motivating factor” in the adverse employment action.  In this 
case, for example, the Port Authority claims that Carroll was 
physically incapable of performing a sergeant’s duties due to 
his injuries and was therefore unqualified for the position.  
Under the Port Authority’s proposed framework, Carroll 
                                                 
5 Sheehan v. Dep’t of Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (utilizing the Transportation Management framework 
to analyze USERRA claims). 
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could not meet his initial burden under USERRA—even if he 
could show that his military service was “a substantial or 
motivating factor”—because he could not demonstrate that he 
was objectively qualified for the promotion to sergeant.   
Carroll, on the other hand, contends that a 
plaintiff’s objective qualifications are only relevant to the 
USERRA analysis after a plaintiff meets his or her initial 
burden.  Once a plaintiff has shown that his or her military 
service was “a substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse 
employment action, Carroll argues, the employer may then 
advance non-discriminatory reasons—which may include a 
lack of qualifications—to show that the employer would have 
taken the adverse action anyway.  In other words, Carroll 
asserts that a plaintiff’s objective qualifications are certainly 
relevant, but they are an affirmative defense to be advanced 
by the employer, not an additional hurdle to be cleared by 
USERRA plaintiffs.  
 
We find Carroll’s reading more persuasive.  The 
statute is clear that an employer violates USERRA if a 
plaintiff’s “membership . . . in the uniformed services is a 
motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the 
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in 
the absence of such membership.”6   All courts of appeals 
interpreting USERRA have recognized this unambiguous 
language and held that a plaintiff meets his or her initial 
burden simply by showing that military service was “a 
substantial or motivating factor” in the adverse employment 
                                                 
6 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)(1). 
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action.7  Indeed, this Court has so held on more than one 
occasion, albeit in non-precedential opinions. 8   The clear 
implication of these uniform holdings is that plaintiffs need 
not plead or prove that they are objectively qualified in order 
to meet their initial burden under USERRA.  Instead, it is 
incumbent on employers to raise a plaintiff’s lack of 
qualifications at the second step of our USERRA framework: 
an employer may argue, for example, that it would have taken 
the same employment actions absent a plaintiff’s military 
service because he or she lacked the necessary qualifications 
for the position in question. 9   This construction not only 
comports with the plain text of USERRA and holdings of 
                                                 
7 Angiuoni v. Town of Billerica, 838 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 
2016); Bradberry v. Jefferson Cty., Tex., 732 F.3d 540, 547 
(5th Cir. 2013); Bobo v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 
741, 755 (6th Cir. 2012); Madden v. Rolls Royce Corp., 563 
F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2009); Wallace v. City of San Diego, 
479 F.3d 616, 624 (9th Cir. 2006); Maxfield v. Cintas Corp. 
No. 2, 427 F.3d 544, 551 (8th Cir. 2005); Coffman v. 
Chugach Support Servs., Inc., 411 F.3d 1231, 1239 (11th Cir. 
2005); Hill v. Michelin N. Am., Inc., 252 F.3d 307, 312 (4th 
Cir. 2001); Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013; Gummo v. Vill. of 
Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1996). 
8 See, e.g., Murphy v. Radnor Twp., 542 F. App’x 173, 177 
(3d Cir. 2013) (not precedential); Hart v. Twp. of Hillside, 
228 F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2007) (not precedential). 
9  See Madden, 563 F.3d at 638-39 (considering the 
employee’s lack of qualifications as part of the employer’s 
evidence at the second step of the USERRA analysis, not as 
part of the employee’s initial burden). 
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courts of appeals, but also effects Congress’s intent to 
“clarify, simplify, and, where necessary, strengthen the 
[previous] veterans’ employment and reemployment rights 
provisions.”10 
The Port Authority’s reliance on other anti-
discrimination statutes does not alter our conclusion.  For 
example, the Port Authority places much weight on the 
uncontroversial proposition that Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) have all 
been interpreted, under the McDonnell Douglas framework, 
to require an initial showing that the plaintiff is objectively 
                                                 
10 Gummo, 75 F.3d at 105 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 65, 103d 
Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1994)).  As courts have explained, 
USERRA was enacted in 1994 to more broadly protect 
uniformed service members from discrimination.  Id.; 
Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1012-13.  For example, the Supreme 
Court held in Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S. 549 
(1981), that liability for violations of the Vietnam Era 
Veterans’ Readjustment Assistance Act (USERRA’s 
predecessor) was unfounded unless the employee’s reserve 
status was the sole motivation for the discriminatory conduct.  
In response, Congress passed USERRA and made clear “that 
a violation occurs when a person’s military service is a 
‘motivating factor’ in the discriminatory action, even if not 
the sole factor.”  Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013 (citing 38 U.S.C. 
§ 4311(c)(1)); see also Gummo, 75 F.3d at 105.  Our 
interpretation of USERRA today embraces this congressional 
objective. 
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qualified for the position sought.11  But the Transportation 
Management framework set forth above, 12  rather than the 
McDonnell Douglas framework, has been consistently 
applied to analyze USERRA claims.13  The Port Authority 
has not identified any case in which a plaintiff failed to meet 
his or her initial burden under the Transportation 
Management framework by failing to plead and prove 
objective qualifications. 
 
IV. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Carroll 
need not plead and prove that he was objectively qualified for 
the 2010 and 2012 promotions to sustain his USERRA 
discrimination suit.  The case will be remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. 
                                                 
11  See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 
2013) (using the McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze 
Title VII and ADEA claims, including the requirement that a 
plaintiff show he or she was qualified for the position in 
question); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 
F.3d 751, 759 n.3, 761 (3d Cir. 2004) (using the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to analyze ADA claims, including the 
requirement that a plaintiff show he or she was “otherwise 
qualified to perform the essential functions of the job”).   
12 See supra note 5. 
13 See supra note 7.   
